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Business incentive programs have been increasingly popular within the EU as regional 
economic development tools to promote employment growth in areas with severely 
distressed and/or declining socio-economic conditions.  Reliable evidenced on the 
effective net employment impact of such initiatives are greatly needed to help refining 
future intervention as, to these days, European policy makers’ decisions can mostly be 
supported only by monitoring and survey analyses.  This paper proposes a method of 
analysis to assess the employment impact of the business incentive initiatives 
implemented in the EU areas with declining industrial production (EU “Objective 2” 
areas).  The proposed method is a comparison-group evaluation approach that uses panels 
of employment data aggregated by geographic areas (similarly to the evaluation approach 
successfully adopted by recent studies of the US Enterprise Zone Programs).  Details of 
the proposed method of analysis are illustrated through an empirical application:  the 
evaluation of the business incentive program co-funded by the European Regional 
Development Fund in the “Objective 2” areas of the Piedmont region (Italy).  Results from 
such application prove the effectiveness and the robustness of the proposed method for 
impact evaluation analyses with longitudinal data, and highlight how the Piedmont’s 
business incentive program did not significantly affect employment in the “Objective 2 
areas”. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last decade, business incentives co-financed through the structural funds (and in 
particular through the European Regional Development fund –ERDF) have become a 
popular regional economic development tool for EU areas with declining industrial 
production (“Objective 2” areas). 
  Business incentive packages have been offered in more than 80 “Objective 2” (Obj.2) 
areas covering 18% of the EU population.  In the 1994-96 programming cycle alone, about 
5 billion Euros (amounting to 11% of the entire EU budget dedicated to the fulfillment of 
economic and social cohesion objectives) were drawn from the ERDF to finance incentive 
packages to support small and medium enterprise (SME) investments in Obj.2 areas.   
These types of initiatives have also an important role in the current 2000-06 cycle of EU 
regional policies and follow similar incentive packages offered from the beginning of the 
eighties in disadvantaged areas (referred to as Enterprise Zones) of the US and the UK.  
  Despite the wide popularity of these initiatives, no robust and consistent ex-post 
evidence on their employment impact in the Obj.2 areas is yet available to help EU policy 
makers refining future geographically-targeted economic development policies. Available 
ex-post employment impact results are indeed mostly derived through applying standard 
macroeconomic multipliers to the volume of investments co-financed by the ERDF in the 
Obj.2 areas.  This evaluation practice is of limited use as it does not attempt to measure 
the actual net pre-post intervention employment change in the target areas and as it cannot 
estimate marginal differences in the employment impact due to the different program 
features adopted across EU regions and/or countries. 
  Robust ex-post impact evaluations based on actual pre-post intervention data, 
however, are difficult to achieve.  Assessing the causality link between the program 
intervention and the observed employment outcomes is a difficult task as it requires 
disentangling changes due to the program from changes due to all of the economic and 
social factors exogenous from the program intervention.  This task is also particularly 
demanding due to the lack of experimental data for the evaluation: Obj.2 areas have 
disadvantaged local economies that would perform differently from their respective 
national economies.  As a consequence, impact estimates can be severely biased if the 
analysis is not carefully implemented controlling for the different spontaneous economic 
trends and/or for all of the exogenous economic factors affecting employment outcomes 
concurrently with the program interventions (Bondonio 2000).  3
  The main feature of this paper is to propose a method of analysis to robustly estimate 
the ex-post net employment impact of business incentives offered in the EU Obj.2 areas. 
The proposed method is developed using a “comparison group evaluation design” where 
pre-post employment changes recorded in the target areas are compared to those of 
adjacent non-target areas.  Impact employment estimates are then retrieved from empirical 
models that make use of a panel of employment data sorted by industry and aggregated by 
geographic units corresponding to the Obj.2 areas and adjacent regions (such types of data 
are typically available from national social security sources and/or census of enterprises).  
This general evaluation strategy has proven reliable for the US Enterprise Zone programs 
(Boarnet and Bogart 1996, Papke 1993, 1994, Dowall 1996, Bondonio and Engberg 2000, 
Bondonio 2001) and is implemented in this study through a number of econometric 
specifications that allow impact estimates to be retrieved net of the following 
unobservable factors exogenous to the program intervention:  
-  local economic trends that may affect Obj.2 areas differently from the non-Obj.2 
areas of the EU; 
-  cyclical macroeconomic factors that may affect employment growth in both 
Obj.2 and non-Obj.2 areas during the program intervention period; 
-  sector-specific market trends that may affect the performance of firms in the 
targeted industrial sectors differently than in non-targeted sectors; 
-  structural characteristics of Obj.2 areas that may affect firm performances 
differently than in non-Obj.2 areas. 
The econometric specifications developed in this study also allow the marginal 
employment impact of different degrees of the programs’ financial generosity to be 
estimated together with differences in the employment impact due to different labor-
intensity levels across industries. 
The proposed method is illustrated in this paper through a case study: the employment 
impact evaluation of the business incentive program implemented in the Obj.2 areas of 
Piedmont (a region in the northwestern corner of Italy) in the 1995-98 period 
(corresponding to the interventions of the 1994-96 programming cycle).  The results of the 
analysis show that the incentive program implemented in the Piedmont region did not 
significantly affect the employment growth recorded in the Obj.2 areas.  The robustness of 
these results is tested through the development of an extensive sensitivity analysis that 
highlights how the non-significance of the impact estimates is consistent across a number  4
of different specifications, data, and assumptions on the selection process of the target 
areas and industries.  The non-significance of Piedmont’s incentive program is in line with 
the recent ex-post empirical evidence produced from the US state Enterprise Zone 
programs (Boarnet and Bogart 1996, Dowall 1996, Greenbaum 1998, Bondonio and 
Engberg 2000, Bondonio 2001). 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the case 
study.  Section 3 illustrates the proposed evaluation strategy.  Section 4 presents the data 
used in the analysis.  Section 5 and 6 summarizes the empirical model and the case-study 
results.  Section 7 describes the features and the results of the sensitivity analysis.  Section 
8 contains concluding remarks. 
 
2. The case study: business incentives in the declining industrial production areas of 
Piedmont 
From the beginning of the nineties, the regional government of Piedmont has promoted 
business incentive programs (co-funded by the European Regional Development Fund -
ERDF) targeting small and medium enterprises (SMEs) located (or willing to start 
operations) in the Piedmont’s areas with the sharpest declining industrial production.   
Target areas of the program intervention were mainly all of the city jurisdictions within 
the Turin province.  There, the predominantly auto component industry experienced in the 
last decades a severe recession that prompted the Italian national government to support 
the designation of the entire Turin province as an EU “Objective 2” (Obj.2) area. 
  For the 1994-96 programming period, those intervention were implemented 
entirely between 1995 and 1998, the business incentive initiatives promoted by the 
Piedmont regional administration were as follows: 
- capital grants to support investment expenditures (up to 15-30% of the total 
investment) aimed at expanding production capacity and/or supporting 
technological upgrades of the production process or restructuring of plants and 
machineries; 
- subsidies to support consulting expenditures (covering 50% of the consulting 
costs) for services to improve the efficiency of the production process; 
- 50% abatement of interest rate costs for investment expenditures to increase 
production capacity and/or ameliorate existing production equipments or plants. 
  5
3. The evaluation strategy 
The regional business incentive program implemented in the Obj.2 areas of Piedmont (as 
those implemented in other EU Obj.2 areas and as geographically-targeted business 
incentive programs in general) are specifically aimed at geographically re-direct economic 
development toward areas with deteriorating socio-economic conditions.  The economic 
rationale that most convincingly supports the provisions of such programs stems from the 
negative externalities that would occur if the determination of the geographical location of 
new or expanding economic activities were left to pure market forces.  Negative 
externalities that may call for interventions to geographically re-direct economic 
development are numerous.  Among them: excessive increase of urban sprawl if decaying 
inner city districts are not recuperated as vital economic and/or residential places.   
Increased pollution and traffic congestion if economic development does not occur 
uniformly with a balanced exploiting of metro and non-metro lands.  Increased criminal 
activity if abandoned industrial and/or residential inner city areas are left in their decaying 
state instead of being properly rehabilitated.  Labor market inefficiency arising from 
under-using resources in high unemployment inner-city areas because of people’s inability 
or unwillingness to move from those areas.  Missed positive opportunities that could be 
brought about by urbanization and localization economies, if private incentives were not 
the only factors affecting firms’ location decisions. 
  To favor job growth and economic development in target areas, the platform of 
incentive packages offered to SMEs located in Obj.2 areas of Piedmont is set to be more 
generous (mainly with respect to the number of beneficiary firms) than the platform of 
incentives offered (from other regional and national sources) in non-Obj.2-areas.  Obj.2-
area incentives, however, are not the unique source of public business incentives in 
Piedmont, as incentives from other national and regional programs are available to SMEs 
anywhere in the region with no specific geographic targets.  
 
3.1. Using geographically aggregated firm-level data 
The non-uniqueness of the Obj.2-area incentives compared to the rest of Piedmont leads to 
choose comparisons of geographically aggregated outcome data between target and non-
target areas (within each specific industrial sector) as the best suited evaluation strategy 
for the analysis.  Firm-by-firm comparisons of employment data between treated and non- 6
treated firms would be instead a less effective evaluation strategy for the following 
reasons: 
A) If treated firms were compared to non-Obj.2-area firms that did not receive any 
other type of financial aid (e.g. the business incentives offered by the 488/1992 or 
the 1329/1956 Italian national programs), unobserved managing abilities of non-
Obj.2 area firms would be likely to be lower than those of firms in the treated 
group (as non-Obj.2-are firms did not succeed in applying for any financial help, 
while treated firms completed their Obj.2-area application successfully).  Such 
difference would generate selection bias in the impact estimates of the program 
intervention as it would be likely that Obj.2-area firms would outperform 
comparison-group firms even in the absence of the Obj.2-aea business incentives. 
B) If treated firms were compared to non-Obj.2-area firms that did receive financial 
aid from sources different than the Obj.2-area program, the validity of impact 
estimates would crucially depend on correctly observing and timing the amount of 
financial aid received by such non-Obj.2-area firms.  It is worth noting that in such 
case results from the analysis would have to be interpreted as estimates of the 
employment elasticity to firm-side subsidies rather than as estimates of the 
employment impact of program interventions targeting selected geographically-
defined economies. 
The evaluation strategy of choice is a difference in difference approach that uses 
geographically-aggregated outcome data recorded in non-target areas as estimates of the 
counterfactual growth rate that would be recorded in the target areas without the program 
intervention.  Such a difference in difference approach is also the one recently 
implemented for the analysis of the US Enterprise Zone programs (Engberg and 
Greenbaum 1999, Greenbaum e Engberg 2000, Bondonio 1998, Bondonio 2001, 
Bondonio e Engberg 2000, Boarnet e Bogart 1996, Papke 1993, 1994). 
 
3.2 Threats to the validity of the analysis and control variables  
Comparisons of employment performances between Obj.2 areas and non-Obj.2 areas yield 
reliable impact estimates only if they are performed through empirical models that 
successfully control for all factors, exogenous to the program intervention, that may affect 
employment outcomes differently between target and excluded areas.  The main factors  7
that may lead to selection and/or omitted variable biases in the analysis can be 
summarized as follows:  
A) Economic conditions affecting prospected costs and revenues of all firms located 
within a same local economy.  Such common local economic conditions may 
affect firm investment and hiring decisions for all firms located within a same 
geographic area regardless of whether or not firms are eligible to receive public 
subsidies. 
B) Sector-specific market conditions that could affect prospected costs and revenues 
for all firms operating in the same industrial sector. 
C) National- or regional-economic cycles (and/or economic conditions) that could 
homogenously affect earning prospects (and therefore investment and hiring 
decisions) for all firms operating in a same national or regional economy. 
When the analysis is implemented with a difference in difference approach that compares 
the pre-post intervention employment performances in Obj.2 areas and non-Obj.2 areas, 
the national- or regional-business cycle factors of point C) do not pose any particular 
threats to the validity of the analysis.  National- or regional-economic cycle conditions 
would affect in the same way Obj.2-area and non-Obj.2-area firms: comparing 
employment performances between target and adjacent non-target areas would yield 
estimates of the program intervention free of biases from broad economic cycle 
conditions.  Empirical program evaluation studies have commonly adopted such difference 
in difference approach to control for national- or regional- economic cycle factors (e.g. 
Batik 1995, Dowall 1996, Greenbaum 1998, Boarnet e Bogart 1996). 
Exogenous factors such as the local economic conditions and sector-specific 
market conditions of points A) and B) could instead pose significant threats to the validity 
of the analysis.  As for the local economic conditions of point A), however, it has to be 
noted that firms eligible for receiving Obj.2-area incentives are predominantly those 
operating in industrial manufacturing productions.  Conditions of the local economy 
surrounding the location of such firms do not typically have noticeable impact on their 
perspective costs and revenues, as outputs and production factors of industrial 
manufacturers tend to be sold and acquired on national and international markets (rather 
than on local markets, as it would be instead the case for service oriented or retail firms).  
Moreover, implementing the proposed difference in difference approach with panel data 
estimators (such as fixed effects, first- or long-differencing) would allow any residual local  8
economic condition (that may affect firm earning perspectives in Obj.2 areas differently 
than in non-Obj.2 areas) to be controlled for, provided that such differences are relatively 
time-unvarying (Bondonio 2000).  The sector-specific market conditions of point B) pose 
instead the greatest threat to the analysis of the Obj.2-area incentive program.  If firms 
operating in different industrial sectors are affected by different sector-specific market 
conditions, they would make different investment and hiring decisions and, therefore, 
display different employment growth rates even in the absence of the program 
intervention.  If the sector composition of Obj.2-area and non-Obj.2-area economies 
differs greatly (as it is the case in the Piedmont region due to the prevailing auto 
component sectors in Obj.2 areas), impact estimates retrieved without properly controlling 
for sector compositions of target and non-target areas would be biased.  To retrieve impact 
estimates without selection bias, the difference in difference approach proposed for the 
analysis have to be implemented with geographically aggregated employment data 
precisely sorted by industrial sector.  With such data, the empirical model used for the 
analysis can yield unbiased impact estimates by conditioning to the same industrial sectors 
the comparison between Obj.2-area and non-Obj.2-area employment performances. 
One possible drawback of conditioning on industrial sectors is that impact 
estimates may not be reliable in the event that the Obj.2-area incentives spur investments 
that allow firms to begin operating in different industrial sectors than those of their 
original core business.  This occurrence, however, is likely to be quite rare as SMEs 
typically operate in the industrial sectors in which their owners/managers posses the best 
ability and/or experience.  Such owner-specific abilities and/or experience do to vary 
easily over time, making unlikely the occurrence of SME business expansions into other 
industrial sectors due to new investments. 
 
4. Data 
Implementing the evaluation strategy described in section 3) requires the availability of 
geographically-aggregated employment data, sorted by industrial sector and firm size (to 
single out data on SMEs alone).  Data have to cover both Obj.2- and non-Obj.2-areas and 
at least years from 1995 to 1998 (corresponding to the implementation period of the 
interventions that are the focus of the analysis).  Geographic units of analysis have to be 
the administrative districts that best overlap Ob.2 areas.  9
  Such data is offered for the Piedmont region (as for the rest of Italy) by the 
“Enterprise Observatory” (EO) of INPS (the national social security agency of italy) 
which tabulates firm-side employment data by province (with a total of 6 Provinces coded 
in Piedmont), industrial sector (with a total of 45 industrial sectors) and firm size (with a 
total of 9 categories sorted by number of employees).  INPS EO are the most adequate 
available data to implement the analysis for the following reasons.  A) They offer more 
reliable employment figures than self-reported employment data obtained from firm 
interviews and/or firm application forms for Obj.2-area incentives.  B) They include 
annual employment flows from 1984 to 1998, covering the 1995-98 intervention period. 
C) They allow employment changes to be sorted into those which occurred in Obj.2 areas 
and non-Obj.2 areas and those which are accounted for by SMEs and large firms
1.  D) 
Being the focus of the analysis limited to SMEs, INPS EO data do not suffer from the 
imprecise geographic sorting that would arise from places of social security registration of 
workers (which determine the INPS EO geographic sorting by province) being very 
different from the actual working places of workers.  Contrary to largest firms, all 
administrative offices and production plants of SMEs are usually located within a same 
site, preventing that, for example, a worker hired in a Southern Italian plant is counted as 
working in the Turin province because of the company’s legal offices being located in 
Turin. 
Table 1 contains the 1984-1998 yearly employment level data accounted for by 




Data on the amount of Obj.2-are financial subsidies received by treated firms are taken 
from the program monitoring reports produced by the consulting firm Viatec (1997, 1999).  
Such data allow Obj.2-area financial subsidy figures to be aggregated by industrial sector 
and sorted by the four EU programming periods of the intervention (1989-1991; 1992-
1993; 1994-1996; and 1997-1999). 
 
                                                 
1 Accuracy in sorting employment changes accounted for by SMEs is however somehow limited by 
the fact that INPS EO data sorts employment size in six classes up to 200 employees and then in only one 
class from 200 to 499 employees .  Thus, the legal SME limit of 250 employees cannot be pinpointed in 
INPS EO data with high accuracy.  10
5. Method of Analysis 
Employment impact estimates of the Obj.2-area business incentives in Piedmont are 
retrieved through three models of analysis and a number of different specifications within 
each model. 
  Adopting three different models of analysis was required due to the imprecise 
sorting by industrial sector of the Viatec data on the subsidies received by treated firms 
from the interventions implemented from 1989 to 1993 (in 1994 no subsidies were 
insteaqd paid).  For subsidies paid to treated firms in such years, Viatec data allow Obj.2-
area subsidy figures to be sorted only into few general industrial sectors that do not 
guarantee optimal controlling for sector-specific market conditions.  In such case the 
advantages of exploiting the entire 1984-98 span of INPS EO data would be offset by the 
poor precision of the industrial sector sorting of the Obj.2-area subsidies awarded in years 
prior to 1994.  The three different models of analysis implemented allow the robustness of 
the impact estimates to be checked against the lack of precision due to either limiting the 
year-span of the INPS EO or using data sorted only into few general industrial sectors. 
This result is achieved by implementing a first model that exploits only the 1994-
98 portion of the INPS EO data with a pre-post intervention long-differencing panel data 
estimator, so that employment data is precisely sorted into narrowly defined industrial 
sectors and no bias may arise from poor sorting by sector and/or year of the Obj.2-area 
subsidy payments within the 1995-98 period.  The second model checks the robustness of 
the results retrieved from the first model (those validity may be compromised by the lack 
of pre-intervention data) by exploiting the entire 1984-98 span of the INPS EO data with a 
first-differencing estimator, implemented on data sorted into fewest industrial sectors.   
The third model implemented for the analysis further asses the robustness of the first two 
models by exploiting the entire 1984-98 span of the INPS EO with employment data 
sorted into narrowly defined industrial sectors.  This result is achieved by zeroing all 
Obj.2-area incentives paid to treated firms prior to 1994, relying on the low volume of pre-
1994 incentive payments compared to the 1995-98 payments. 
For space constraints and in favor of clarity of exposition, exact formal 
specifications and results will be detailed in the next section only for the first of these 
models.  Exact specifications and results for the two remaining models will be instead 
briefly summarized in the sensitivity analysis section. 
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5.1 The baseline model 
The first model implemented for the analysis (which exploits the 1994-98 portion of the 
INPS EO data with narrowly defined industrial sector sorting) is formalized as follows: 
 
ln(Yjpt/Yjpt-4) = λAt  + βSj  +γPp+ φTjpt + ejpt,        ( 1 )  
 
where: 
j =  industrial sector; 
p =   province; 
Yjpt/Yjpt-4= employment growth recorded by industrial sector j in province p in the 4-
year period ending with year t (with t=1998 and t-4=1994); 
Sj =  1 if industrial sector j is awarded with Obj.2-area incentive payments in any 
Obj.2 areas of Piedmont; 
0 otherwise; 
Pp=   1 if province p is ever designated as Obj.2 area; 
0 otherwise; 
At=   1 if the 4-year period ending with year t is such that Obj.2-area incentives have 
been paid to any industrial sector in any Obj.2-area of Piedmont; 
0 otherwise [limiting the analysis to 1994-98 data, At is always equal to 1 and the 
term λ represents the baseline growth rate of the model]; 
Tjpt=(Sj*Pp*At)=1 if Obj.2-area incentives are paid to sector j in province p in the 4-
year period ending with time t; 
 0  otherwise; 
ejpt =white noise error, iid (0,σ
2). 
 
The model of eq. (1) [in which cross-section units of analysis are sector-province pairs (pj) 
and time units are 4-years periods t – (t-4)] regresses 4-year employment growth rates of 
pairs (j,p) on a baseline growth rate, a sector and a province dummy, and a treatment 
status variable.  The model stems from long-differencing (with 4-year intervals) the 
following general specification: 
 
LnYjpt = λAt  + βtS*j + γtP*p + φTjpt + αjp + ujpt,      (2) 
where:  12
S* =S/3; P*=P/3; 
t=1994,…1998; 
αjp = sector-province (j,p) fixed effect component (part of the employment level Yjpt 
accounted for by unobservable, time unvarying, sector-province characteristics) 
ujpt =white noise error, iid (0,σ
2). 
 
The long-differencing transformation yielding the model of eq. (1) is necessary to 
eliminate the fixed effect component αpj of eq.(2). Direct OLS estimation of eq.(2) would 
be likely to yield impact estimates with selection bias due to cov(αpj  , Tpjt)≠0 [i.e. 
correlation between treatment assignment and unobservable characteristics specific of 
each  (j,p) pair].  Long-differencing is chosen over more traditional panel-data 
transformations [such as first-differencing (Ypjt-Ypjt-1) or differences from the mean (Ypjt-
Ypj.)] due to the suspected imprecise sorting by year within the 1995-98 interval of the 
Obj.2-area incentive payments. 
  Eq. (1) summarizes the evaluation strategy described in section 3) in a simple 
linear specification which is recommendable due to the limited number of observations 
available for the analysis [cross tabulating the 6 provinces and the roughly 45 sectors in 
which the Piedmont INPS EO data are sorted generates 266 observations available for the 
analysis.  In eq. (1), the impact estimate of the program intervention (φ) is retrieved 
through comparisons of employment growth rates between Obj.2 areas and non-Obj.2-
aeas controlling for the exogenous market conditions specifically experienced by the set of 
industrial sectors targeted by the program intervention (Sj) and the province-specific 
economic trends (Pp) affecting employment growth rates of all sectors located within 
Obj.2-areas independently from the program intervention. 
Thus, in sum, the baseline model illustrated in eq. (1) allows impact estimates of 
the program intervention to be retrieved net of the following linear exogenous influences: 
-cyclical macroeconomic factors that may affect the general baseline employment 
growth rate in Piedmont during the 1995-98 period; 
-sector-specific market conditions that may affect employment growth of targeted 
sectors differently than that of non-targeted sectors; 
-province-specific socio-economic factors that may affect employment growth in 
Obj.2 areas (i.e the Turin province) differently than elsewhere in Piedmont;  13
-unobserved time unvarying characteristics of sector-province (j,p) pairs that may 
affect employment growth of targeted (j,p) pairs differently than non-targeted (j,p) 
pairs. 
Eq. (1) model, instead, would yield biased impact estimates in the event of selection into 
treatment of (j,p) pairs based on their unobservable future growth potential [such 
unobservable potential could be formalized by adding to eq. (2) a simple linear term such 
as: βjpt)].  If such (j,p) pair-specific growth potential were correlated with the treatment 
assignment variable [i.e. cov(βjpt, Tjpt)≠0], only a random growth rates model (Heckman 
and Hotz 1989, Papke 1993, 1994, Boarnet and Bogart 1996, Bondonio 2000, and 
Bondonio and Engberg 2000) would yield unbiased impact estimates of the program 
intervention.  Random growth rates model , however, are not applicable in this case due 
to: 
- data having limited number of observations and imprecise sorting by year of the 
Obj.2-area incentive payments; 
- the hypothesis cov(βpjt, Tpjt)≠0 being very little plausible:  correlation between 
(j,p) pair–specific unobserved employment growth potentials and assignment 
into treatment would require the program intervention to target sector-province 
pairs based on their future economic performances, awarding best or worst future 
performers.  Such hypothesis is highly implausible because selection into 
treatment of firms and/or eligible locations for Obj.2-area incentives follows a 
ranking process based on well defined criteria that do not contemplate 
forecasting future economic performances based on information not available to 
the evaluator. 
Finally, it is worth noting that, unlike the case of the US Enterprise Zones (Greenbaum e 
Engberg 2000, Engberg e Greenbaum 1999, Bondonio e Engberg 2000), the analysis 
could not be implemented adopting a statistical matching or conditioning on a propensity 
score method due to the limited number of observations available in the data (as a result of 
Obj.2 areas being significantly larger than the US EZ areas). 
 
5.2 Model specifications 
Two additional specifications are implemented to add flexibility to the baseline model of 
eq. (1).  These two additional models allow the analysis to estimate whether or not greater 
volumes of incentive payments spurred greater employment changes in the targeted  14
sector-province (j,p) pairs, and whether or not the employment impact of the program 
intervention varied across targeted sectors: 
 
ln(Yjpt/Yjpt-4) = λAt  + JβJ S_Jj  +γPp+ ϕFinjpt + ejpt,
 2




J = 1,…M,; being M the total number of treated industrial sectors (S=1); 
JβJ S_Jj = set of M dummy variables (β1S_1,… βMS_M), being:  
S_1   = 1 if j=1 
   =  0  otherwise; 
Finjpt = thousand of EUROs per employee awarded to the sector-province (j,p) pair 
in the 4-year period ending with year t; 
 
ln(Yjpt/Yjpt-4) = λAt  + JβJ S_Jj  +γPp+ JϕJ Fin_Jjpt+ ejpt,
 3




JϕJ Fin_Jjpt = set of M terms (ϕ1 Fin_1,… ϕM Fin_M), such that: 
Fin_1 = thousand of EUROs per employee awarded to the sector-province (j,p) 
pair in the 4-year period ending with year t if j=J; 
= 0 otherwise. 
 
The specifications of eqs. (3) and (4) differ from the baseline model of eq. (1) as they 
substitute the treatment dummy (Tjpt) with the variable (Finjpt) and the set of M variables 
(Fin_Jjpt), respectively.  Specification (4) differs from (3) as it allows the analysis to 
estimate whether or not the employment impact of the program intervention varies across 
sectors, due to across-sector differences in the labor intensity of production (so that 
                                                 
2 Some specifications estimated from the model of eq. (3) do not include the term γPp and/or contain 
a single term βSj in place of the set of variables JβJ S_Jj.  Table 5 illustrates the complete set of estimated 
specifications. 
3 Due to the limited number of observations available for the analysis, the term γPp was omitted 
from some of the estimated specifications in eq. (5) and/or a single term βSj was included in place of the set 
of variables JβJ S_Jj.  Table 5 illustrates the complete set of estimated specifications.  15
investments of the same financial amount may produce different employment outcomes 
across sectors).  
 
6. Results 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 illustrates 1994 employment stocks and 1994-98 employment growth rates sorted 
into Obj.2 and non-Obj.2 areas and cross tabulated by targeted and non-targeted industrial 
sectors.  The employment growth posted by targeted industrial sectors has been 9.5% in 
Obj.2 areas and 7.1% in the non-Obj.2 areas of Piedmont.  However, such employment 
growth differential between Obj.2 and non-Obj.2 areas cannot be interpreted as a net result 
of the program intervention.  As mentioned in the previous section, other factors, 
independent from the program intervention, may have contributed to determine the 
observed employment outcome.  Indeed, Table 2 shows that such Obj.2- versus non-
Obj.2-area differential is recorded also in non targeted industrial sectors, a circumstance in 
sharp contrast with the hypothesis of the program intervention being the sole cause of the 




Table 3 summarizes the total volume of subsidies and capital grants awarded to targeted 
SMEs in Obj.2 area within the 1994-98 period, aggregated and sorted by industrial sectors.  
Metal manufacturing and mechanical productions are the sectors most generously 
awarded, receiving a total of nearly 58 million Euros of subsidies and contributions.   
Chemical, pharmaceutical, and synthetic fiber productions come second, with nearly 9 
million Euros of subsidies and contributions (Viatec 1999).  Table 4 tabulates the non-





6.2 Results from the impact evaluation analysis 
Models of eq. (1, 3 and 4) are estimated with various specifications that include a different 
number of control variables.  Due to space constraints and for the sake of clarity of  16
exposition, only results from the specifications described in Table 5 are illustrated in this 
section.  Results from other specifications will be instead briefly summarized in the 




Table 6 shows the results from specifications (I-IV) of eqs. (1) and (3).  Impact estimates 
retrieved from such specifications show that the employment growth recorded in the 
targeted sectors within the Obj.2 areas was not significantly affected by the program 
intervention, once sector-specific, time-specific and area-specific exogenous influences 
are properly accounted for.  Estimates for both treatment variables [i.e T and Fin] are 
highly insignificant in all four specifications (I-IV).  Coefficient estimates of the control 
variables in the four specifications show that the marginal employment growth rate 
recorded in the targeted sectors was 10 percentage points lower than that recorded in the 
other sectors of the Piedmont economy [i.e. the coefficient estimates for the variable S 
being  -0.105, -0.100, -0.100 and -0.097 for specifications (I), (II), (III) and (IV) 
respectively].  Aggregated employment growth rate of Obj.2 areas is instead estimated to 
be marginally similar to that of non-Obj.2 areas [i.e. the coefficient estimates for the 
variable P being highly insignificant in both specification (II) and (IV)].  In this respect, 
results from Table 6 do not highlight any province-specific employment growth 




Table 7, finally, reports results from specifications (V-VII) of eq. (4).  As mentioned in 
section 5) such specifications should offer greater flexibility to the analysis, allowing 
impact estimates to capture across sectors marginal differences in the employment effect 
of the program intervention.  Results from Table 7 (in which all coefficient estimates are 
highly insignificant), however, suggest that the limited number of observations available 
for the analysis does not allow such specifications (which contain a high number of 
control variables) to be estimated with sufficient precision. 
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7. Sensitivity analysis 
As mentioned in section 5), the robustness of the results reported in Tables 5-7 is tested by 
replicating the analysis with two additional models and a variety of different specifications 
that allow the entire temporal span of the data to be exploited under a number of 
alternative restrictions.  The first of such models exploits yearly employment changes 
(sorted by province, industrial sector and firm size) from 1984 and 1998.  The analysis is 
performed with a first-differencing estimator implemented on data sorted only into a few 
grossly defined industrial sectors.  Data on program incentive payments to target SMEs 
are aggregated and sorted by year and industrial sector.  Incentive payments are then 
operationalized either as a treatment dummy or as the per-worker monetary value of all 
incentives paid for each sector-province (j,p) pair in each year (t).  In its single-treatment 
dummy form, such model can be formalized as follows:  
 
ln(Yjpt / Yjpt-1) = λAt + βSj  +γPp+ φTjpt + ejpt,         ( 5 )  
 
where: 
t = year (1985-98); 
At                     = 1 if year t is within the payment period of the program incentives; 
       = 0 otherwise. 
 
Eq. (5) model differs from eq. (1) in at least two ways: 
-  the model is implemented as a first differencing (Ypjt-Ypjt-1) [rather than a long 
differencing  (Ypjt-Ypjt-3)] transformation of eq. (2); 
-  industrial sectors (j) are fewer and less precisely defined than those of eq. (1); 
Using instead monetary values of the incentives as treatment variables, the model can be 
formalized in the two following specifications: 
 
ln(Yjpt / Yjpt-1) = pyλpyA_pyt + JβJ S_Jj  + γPp  + ϕFinjpt + ejpt    (6) 
 
where, 
py = 1990, 1991,…1998 (payment years = years in which Obj.2-area incentives were 
paid);  18
pyλpyA_pyt = set of nine terms (λ19901990t, ...λ19981998t), being: 
1990t     = 1 if year t is 1990;  
= 0 otherwise;  





ln(Yjpt / Yjpt-1) = pyλpyA_pyt\ + JβJ S_Jj  + γPp  + JϕJ Fin_Jjpt + ejpt   (7) 
 
where, 
JϕJ Fin_Jjpt = set of  M terms (ϕ1 Fin_1,… ϕM Fin_M), being: 
Fin_1  = thousand of EUROs per employee awarded to the sector-province 
(j,p) pair in year t if sector j = 1; 
= 0 otherwise. 
 
Eq. (7) differs from eq. (6) as it retrieves impact estimates of the intervention through a set 
of sector-specific monetary values of the Obj.2-area incentives awarded, rather than 
through a single treatment variable. 
  The second model with which the analysis is replicated varies from those of eqs. 
(5-7) only due to the greater number of industrial sector into which employment data are 
sorted [as mentioned in section 5), such result is achieved at the cost of neglecting pre-
1994 program incentive payments]. Thus, formal specifications of this last model is 
identical to those of eqs. (5-7) except for industrial sectors (j) being coded as more 
narrowly defined Italian standard classification classes, and years of incentive payments 
being only 1995-1998. 
  Sensitivity analyses were finally completed by estimating each of the proposed 
model with a number of alternative specifications defined by simplifying or omitting those 
control variables that were too highly correlated with the treatment variable/s.  Results 
from all of the described alternative models and specifications are very similar to those 
presented in section 6), highlighting the robustness of the impact estimates presented in 
Tables (5-7).  For space constraints and for the sake of clarity of expositions, the results  19
from such additional models/specifications are not illustrated here, but are available upon 
request to the author. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Business incentives co-financed through the structural funds have become in recent years 
a popular regional economic development tool for the EU areas declining industrial 
production (“Objective 2” -Obj.2- areas).  This paper proposes a method of analysis to 
robustly estimate the ex-post net employment impact of Obj.2-area business incentives 
through a “comparison group evaluation design” based on geographically-aggregated 
panels of employment data from official statistical sources (national social security or 
national census bureaus).  The proposed method is applied to a case study: the 
employment impact evaluation of the Obj.2-area business incentive program implemented 
in the Piedmont region (Northwestern Italy) from 1995 to 1998 (corresponding to the 
interventions of the 1994-96 EU programming cycle).  The results of the analysis show 
that no significant employment change was induced by the program in the Obj.2 areas.  
Such finding can be interpreted in at least two ways: 
-  Piedmont Obj.2-area business incentive program did not significantly modify 
investing and hiring behaviors of targeted firms.  As targeted entrepreneurs 
would have make the same investment and hiring decisions even in the absence 
of the program intervention, Obj.2-area incentive payments constituted a money 
prize to entrepreneurs that would invest and hire workers in the target areas 
anyway.  Such money prices benefited all of the economies where the goods and 
services bought by entrepreneurs with the prize money were produced; 
-  Obj.2- area incentives induced only very small employment changes in the 
targeted areas of Piedmont compared to the size of their economies.  Even if 
marginally affecting investment and hiring decisions of some targeted firm, the 
program intervention was not sufficient to achieve any employment change large 
enough to be relevant for the economy of Obj.2 areas. 
The zero-impact results of the analysis are in line with the findings of some recent 
evaluations of similar geographically-targeted business incentive programs such as the US 
Enterprise Zones (e.g. Dowall 1996, Boarnet and Bogart 1996, Bondonio and Engberg 
2000).  Findings from this paper are instead difficult to compare with those produced on 
the business incentive programs implemented through co-funding from the European  20
Regional Development Fund in other EU Obj.2 areas.  Employment evaluation studies on 
EU Obj.2-area business incentive programs have been so far predominantly produced as 
either monitoring reports (assessing the employment impact of the program intervention 
through applying standard economic multipliers to the volume of subsidized investments), 
or as business survey studies.  As none of the available empirical evidence on Obj. 2 area 
programs is derived from employment data collected by official statistical sources, indeed 
one of the main contributions offered by the paper (beyond the specific empirical results 
produced on the Piedmont case study) is illustrating a model of analysis that can be 
replicated for other Obj.2-area business incentive programs in order to offer results with 
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1984 163,599 80,373 -- 177,684 55,922 --
1985 164,273 84,445 1,38% 4,38% 179,556 58,914 1,29% 5,54%
1986 167,100 87,601 4,38% 6,61% 179,068 61,800 4,43% 5,88%
1987 171,722 92,357 3,30% 5,86% 184,379 65,465 2,45% 6,21%
1988 178,309 96,348 4,18% 4,09% 189,052 69,054 2,89% 4,80%
1989 184,225 99,577 3,97% 3,94% 191,344 72,283 2,97% 4,64%
1990 181,868 100,949 0,13% 1,43% 191,233 75,017 0,45% 3,08%
1991 177,227 101,570 -2,35% 0,84% 190,607 77,036 0,19% 2,00%
1992 173,087 100,959 -2,79% -0,49% 186,874 77,959 -2,87% 1,65%
1993 166,037 98,429 -5,39% -2,47% 180,866 77,954 -3,27% 0,71%
1994 169,379 97,157 1,43% 1,69% 184,228 81,316 1,71% 3,31%
1995 175,479 99,315 3,49% 2,82% 188,753 82,830 2,73% 3,70%
1996 173,738 100,347 0,46% 1,51% 186,830 84,228 -0,03% 1,88%
1997 174,381 102,197 1,70% 2,72% 187,746 86,152 1,08% 2,76%
1998 178,999 109,011 3,28% 5,24% 189,239 89,471 2,01% 4,91%
Source: INPS "Enterprise Observatory"
* Obj.2 areas = Turin Province
** stocks at 31/12Table 2: 1994-98 employment growth in industrial SMEs
Sectors Geographic areas
1994 employment 








Obj.2 and non-Obj.2 
areas  (% points 
values)
Target sectors
(a) Obj.2 areas* 156,83 14,905 0.095
Non-Obj.2 areas 161,322 11,519 0.071
0.024
Non-target sectors Obj.2 areas* 109,706 12,824 0.116
Non-Obj.2 areas 104,223 10,327 0.099
0.017
* Turin Province
(a) Target sectors are those in which at least one firms received incentive payments in the 1994-98 periodTable 3: 1994-98 incentive payments to Obj.2-area SMEs
Industrial 









food Food, sugar, drinks and tobacco products 41, 42 2,517,727
craft
Furniture and fixtures, leather and leather products, stone, 
clay, glass and concrete products
24, 44,46,49 4,660,961
chpha Chemical, pharmaceutical and synthetic fiber products 25,26 9,013,085
constr Constructions 50 1,654,705
mining
Metal and coal mining, oil and gas extraction, mining and 





Electronic, industrial and commercial machinery and 
computer equipment
33 1,376,339




rubplast Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products 48 6,404,496
repair Automotive and miscellaneous repairs 67 499,923
textile Textile mill products, apparel and other finished products 43,45, 3,723,088
paper
Paper and allied products, printing, publishing and allied 
industries
47 4,892,330
trasp Ground transportation 72 785,004
utilities Electric, gas and sanitary services 16, 17 51,128
Total 93,549,269
(a) In Euro.  Actual payment period: 1995-1998.
Table 4: 1994-98 non-target sectors 
Industrial 






comm Wholesale and retail trade, hotel services
61,62,63,64,
65,66
wairtran Water and air transportation 73,74,75
atrs Transportation services 76,77
cmca Communications 79
crfibser Credit, finance and business services 81,82,83
serv Public and other private services
92,93,94,95,
96,97,98Table 5: Estimated specifications
   (Sensitivity analysis non included)
Model Specification Independent variables
(I) S T 
Eq. (2)
(II) S P T 
(III) S Fin
Eq. (3)
(IV) S P Fin 
(V) S P  Fin_J (21 dummies)
Eq. (4) (VI) S_J (21 dummies) Fin_J (21 dummies)
(VII) S_J (21 dummies) P Fin_J (21 dummies)Table 6: Employment impact of Obj.2-area incentive payments to SMEs
                Results from eq. (1) and (3) [Dependent variable: 1994-98 employment growth]
                    Regression coefficient estimates(+)
                  Independent variables
Specific.     
(I)
Specific.     
(II)
Specific.     
(III)
Specific.     
(IV)
CONSTANT 0.166*** 0.161*** 0.166*** 0.159***
(0.028) 0.000 (0.031) 0.000 (0.028) 0.000 (0.028) 0.000
TREATMENT VARIABLE
 1 if sector and province are targets of the intervention,  0 otherwise T 0.034 0.007 - -
(0.077) 0.654 (0.108) 0.947
Fin=thousand of Euros per employee (if sector and province are targets) Fin - - 0.007 -0.021
(0,045) 0,929 (0,052) 0,826
CONTROL VARIABLES
Sector-specific economic trend S -0.105** -0.100** -0.100** -0.097**
(0.042) 0.014 (0.045) 0.026 (0.041) 0.017 (0.042) 0.023
Area-specific economic trend    P=1 if province is Obj.2 area P - 0.027 - 0.037
                                                            0 if province is not Obj.2 area (0.075) 0.713 (0.062) 0.542
Number of observations 266 266 266 266
Adjusted R2 0.255 0.202 0.177 0.154
F  3.88 3.19 2.98 2.11
Prob>F 0.0176 0.0234 0.0324 0.0597
* p-value<0.1      ** p-value<0.05        *** p-value<0.01
Standard deviations in parenthesis. P-values in italicsTable 7: Employment impact of Obj.2-area incentive payments to SMEs
                Results from eq. (4) [Dependent variable: 1994-98 employment growth]
Regression coefficient estimates(+)
                  Independent variables   Specification (V)                  Specification (VI)                    Specification (VII)
CONSTANT 0.161***  0.000 0,166***  0,000 0,161***  0,000
INCENTIVE PAYMENT VARIABLES (1=1,000 euros per employee)
(SECT. ATECO81)
Petroleum refining and related services Fin_14 0.385 0.805 0.247 0.885 1.258 0.726
Electric, gas and energy production Fin_16 0.354 0.856 1.574 0.457 1.423 0.943
Extraction and mining Fin_23 0.755 0.603 -0.702 0.654 -0.817 0.511
Fabricated products from non-metal minerals Fin_24 0.216 0.770 0.116 0.998 -0.046 0.611
Chemical and synthetic fiber products Fin_25 0 0.990 -0.036 0.819 -0.048 0.955
Fabricated metal products Fin_31 0.017 0.972 -0.019 0.970 -0.058 0.768
Mechanical machinery Fin_32 0.156 0.703 -0.104 0.813 -0.137 0.915
Computers and information system equipments Fin_33 1.570 0.232 1.155 0.415 1.053 0.763
Electronic and communication machineries Fin_34 0.005 0.991 -0.121 0.855 -0.170 0.468
Automotive and automotive components production Fin_35 0.048 0.840 -0.042 0.868 -0.061 0.803
Non-automotive transportation equipments Fin_36 0.478 0.345 0.666 0.225 0.625 0.815
Bio-medical and optical goods, precision tools Fin_37 -0.071 0.958 0.164 0.912 0.056 0.264
Food, sugar, drinks and tobacco products Fin_42 -0.154 0.426 -0.112 0.596 -0.125 0.970
Textile production Fin_43 -0.228 0.676 -0.005 0.990 -0.048 0.556
Leather products Fin_44 -0.251 0.710 0.178 0.807 0.125 0.934
Furniture and wood products Fin_46 -0.302 0.687 -0.052 0.947 -0.110 0.866
Paper and allied products, printing, publishing and allied industries Fin_47 -0.056 0.917 -0.044 0.939 -0.085 0.892
Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products Fin_48 0.063 0.855 -0.050 0.896 -0.077 0.884
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries Fin_49 -0.824 0.893 2.927 0.658 2.439 0.843
Constructions Fin_50 -1.186 0.820 -0.007 0.999 -0.416 0.717
Automotive and miscellaneous repairs Fin_67 -0.383 0.915 -0.034 0.993 -0.315 0.942
Ground transportation (no railroads) Fin_72 1.277 0.614 0.991 0.717 0.793 0.777
CONTROL VARIABLES
Sector-specific economic trend S -0.100** 0.031                (a)                (a)
Area-specific economic trend    P=1 if province is Obj.2 area P 0.357  0.722 - 0.027
                                                            0 if province is not Obj.2 area
Number of observations 266 266 266
Adjusted R2 0.0632 0.0844 0.0887
F  1.44 1.53 1.54
Prob>F 0.1014 0.0993 0.0994
* p-value<0.1      ** p-value<0.05        *** p-value<0.01
P-values in italics
(a)  Coeffiicent estimates for the 21 sector-specific dummies of specifications (V) and (VI) are omitted for clarity of expositions.
      Complete results are available upon request to the author.